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News about Genetics and Smoking Priming, Family Smoking History, and News
Story Believability on Inferences of Genetic Susceptibility to Tobacco Addiction
Abstract
Print news stories about genetics convey information to the public. This study assesses the effects of
priming a belief in genetic susceptibility to smoking addiction on smokers' inferences about their own
susceptibility to smoking addiction, their efficacy to quit smoking, and their intention to get a genetic test
for addiction susceptibility. Respondents were 450 young adult smokers surveyed on the telephone in a
randomized experiment embedded in a questionnaire about cigarette smoking practices. In the priming
condition, respondents heard a news story about genes for smoking addiction. In the unprimed condition,
respondents heard a news story concerning the gender of the offspring of smokers. Priming with the
genetics news story did not affect respondents' inferences about personal genetic susceptibility to
smoking addiction. However, those finding the news story believable and having a strong family history of
smoking were more likely to infer a greater personal genetic susceptibility.

Keywords
smoking, priming, genetic testing, family smoking

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/108

JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA1
CARYN LERMAN
ANCA ROMANTAN
LEMI BARUH

News about Genetics and Smoking
Priming, Family Smoking History, and News Story
Believability on Inferences of Genetic Susceptibility
to Tobacco Addiction
Print news stories about genetics convey information to the public. This study
assesses the effects of priming a belief in genetic susceptibility to smoking
addiction on smokers’ inferences about their own susceptibility to smoking
addiction, their efficacy to quit smoking, and their intention to get a genetic
test for addiction susceptibility. Respondents were 450 young adult smokers
surveyed on the telephone in a randomized experiment embedded in a questionnaire about cigarette smoking practices. In the priming condition, respondents heard a news story about genes for smoking addiction. In the unprimed
condition, respondents heard a news story concerning the gender of the offspring of smokers. Priming with the genetics news story did not affect respondents’ inferences about personal genetic susceptibility to smoking addiction.
However, those finding the news story believable and having a strong family
history of smoking were more likely to infer a greater personal genetic
susceptibility.
Keywords: smoking; priming; genetic testing; family smoking

Molecular genetics research provides unprecedented opportunities for individuals to learn about their genetic predisposition to potentially preventable
diseases and to modify their behaviors to reduce risk (Marteau & Lerman,
2001). Genetic discoveries are not limited to disease susceptibility but may
also reveal ways in which our behavior patterns are influenced by heredity

(Plomin & Crabbe, 2000). One potentially important area of emerging science
concerns the role of genetic factors in tobacco use and addiction (Hall, Madden, & Lynskey, 2002; Lerman & Berrettini, 2003; Munafo, Johnstone,
Murphy, & Walton, 2001). Although not without controversy, new knowledge
about genetics and tobacco dependence may ultimately lead to reductions in
disease risk by motivating individuals to quit smoking and by enhancing the
effectiveness of targeted treatment (Lerman & Niaura, 2002).
This explosion of research in molecular and behavioral genetics research
has led to another explosion—news media coverage of genetic information.
By news media coverage we do not mean organized campaigns designed to
change behavior but rather public news information about new scientific evidence relevant to a particular behavior. Our own preliminary analyses indicate that in the period 1997 to 2003, about 8,000 stories per year appear about
genetic influences on human behavior and disease across sources, including
The New York Times, the AP Wire Services, broadcast news, and the top 20
newspapers in the United States. Although much has been written about the
way that the news media cover genetics (Condit, 1999; Condit et al., 2001;
Condit, Ofulue, & Sheedy, 1998; Craig, 2000; Tambor, Bernhardt, Rodgers,
Holtzman, & Geller, 2002), it is not yet clear how this information or its representation will affect attitudes and decisions about behavior change among
individuals at increased risk.2
Researchers have lamented this lack of knowledge of how the presentation of health information to the public affects the public’s attitudes in a variety of arenas in addition to genetics. The Lancet Oncology editorialized that
new research findings about hormone replacement therapy created panic in
the public when it could have helped women, in consultation with their physicians, make better, well-tailored decisions about this therapy (The Lancet
Oncology, 2004). Researchers have been divided about the impact that media
coverage of genetics might have with some arguing that the public will be
lead to conclude that traits, behaviors, and diseases are biologically determined (Nelkin & Lindee, 1995) and others arguing that media coverage has
not shifted appreciably over time in its attributions about biological and environmental causes (Condit et al., 1998). A better understanding of the impact
of genetic risk information on attitudes and behavior change is needed (Saab
et al., 2004).
With regard to smoking behavior and genetic susceptibility to addiction,
news media coverage could have a variety of consequences on public perceptions and behaviors. Increased awareness of genetic risk for tobacco dependence may enhance motivation to quit smoking or to seek treatment. Alternatively, the perception that one’s risk is genetic and immutable might reduce
personal efficacy, generate a sense of fatalism, and reduce intentions to

change smoking behaviors. In a study on the risk for heart disease, when participants thought their risk was determined by a genetic test, the condition
was seen as less preventable (French, Marteau, Senior, & Weinman, 2000). In
a related study, smokers informed of a genetic predisposition to lung cancer
were more fearful but no more likely to quit smoking (Lerman et al. 1997). In
an analogue study (Wright, Weinman, & Marteau, 2003), smokers who were
informed of a hypothetical genetic predisposition to tobacco dependence were
significantly more likely to request a cessation method deemed effective
based on their genetic risk. However, they were also less likely to report that
they would rely on their own will power, suggesting that genetic information
may have undermined their sense of personal efficacy.
The potential for news media coverage to influence health beliefs and
behavior change has been supported in several studies (Fan & Halloway,
1994; Yanovitsky & Stryker, 2001). One of the basic ways that media coverage
of an issue can influence audiences is through priming. Priming is the process
of activating specific nodes in an audience’s mental storehouse of information
through cues employed within the media’s message. Although priming has
not been seriously investigated as the basis for the news media’s role in
reducing risky behavior nor in the likelihood of obtaining a genetic test, it has
been studied in a variety of other areas. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) exposed
some audiences to news about specific issues (economy) and others to different issues (foreign affairs). Subsequent judgments depended more on the
issues primed in news, even though controls and those exposed to news had
the same mean scores on the issues primed. However, the associations
between the primed issues and the judgments were stronger than in the control. The information in the news accounts may have made the particular
issues more salient and more likely the basis for judgment, even though
opinions on the issue did not change.
Advertisers are concerned with priming effects as well. Yi (1990a) studied
magazine ads for a product (larger automobiles) that could be interpreted in
more than one way (safe vs. fuel inefficient). Some read a prior story about the
safety of air travel and others read a prior story about a CEO in the oil industry. Those reading the air travel safety story tended to have more favorable
purchase intentions and attitudes toward the brand and toward the ad than
those reading about the oil industry executive. The results were attributed to
more safety thoughts about the ad in the air travel condition and more fuel
economy thoughts in the oil condition. The article read before seeing the ad
primed certain thoughts leading the interpretation in one of two specific
directions. Yi (1990b) also found semantic priming effects with ambiguous
advertisements about computers. Similar findings have been obtained in
priming racial stereotypes (Valentino, 1999; Valentino, Traugott, &

Hutchings, 2002), social norms regarding condom use (Ybarra & Trafimow,
1998), foreign policy judgments (Gilovich, 1981), and character judgments of
political candidates (Domke, 2001; Domke, Shah, & Wackman, 1998).
In sum, although priming cues have not been widely studied in health risk
and prevention contexts, the manipulation of specific cues in media messages
about health issues should operate similarly. Specifically, activating the audience’s thoughts about the genetic bases for addiction and about the role of
family history in smoking habits should increase the salience of these
thoughts for the respondents, thereby making them more accessible. This elevated accessibility should increase the association between belief in a genetic
predisposition toward smoking addiction and personal efficacy and an intention to obtain a genetic test. The priming of audience cognitions does not necessarily change attitudes, opinions, intentions, or behaviors but rather can
make the primed objects more accessible from memory, and to the extent that
the primed cognition has a mental association with other related cognitions,
those too should be activated and made more accessible.
We hypothesized that news information about genetic susceptibility to
smoking addiction would affect efficacy to quit smoking and the intention to
obtain a genetic test for smoking addiction through a cognitive mediator.
That mediator is the inference (measured as a likelihood) that the recipient of
the genetic information is at risk for a genetic addiction to smoking. Our
expectation was that a person’s own smoking history and that of their immediate family members would interact with the news information about
genetic susceptibility such that those with a family history of smoking would
be more likely to infer they were susceptible to a genetic basis for their
smoking behavior.
Although the meaning of the word genetic shows considerable variability
in the public at large, some of which is scientifically incorrect, most respondents in one study were capable of illustrating a genetic characteristic that
ran in their own families (Lanie et al., 2004). This suggests that people have a
sense of the role of family history in providing a genetic basis for various characteristics. The cognitive inference of genetic susceptibility should arise in
those with a family history but not necessarily in those with little or no family
history of smoking. This is precisely what priming does: It activates certain
cognitions (e.g., smoking addiction) and connects these to other related
cognitions (genetic basis for addiction), especially in those for whom the connection is stronger a priori (family history) than those for whom it is weaker
(little or no history). The hypothesized relationships among variables are
described schematically in Figure 1.
Two outcome measures are tested in addition to the mediating cognitive
variable (that is, the inference of personal genetic susceptibility to smoking):

MODEL

Intention
Genetic Test

Genetic Information
(Primes, frames,
exemplars, credibility)
Inference of Genetic
Susceptibility

Smoking History
(Personal, family)

Efficacy
to Quit

Figure 1.

Schematic Model of the Direct and Indirect Relationships Among Genetic
Information, Smoking History, Inference of Genetic Susceptibility, Efficacy
to Quit, and Intention to get a Genetic Test

intention to get a genetic test and efficacy to quit smoking. Self-efficacy and
perceived behavioral control have been shown to be important predictors of
future behavior (Ajzen, 1985). Perceived behavioral control and past smoking
behavior are good predictors of actual smoking behavior (Godin, Valois,
Lepage, & Desharnais, 1992; O’Callaghan, Callan, & Baglioni, 1999; Sutton &
Eiser, 1984). Self-efficacy has been shown to be an important predictor of the
intention to quit smoking, even after the effects of attitude and subjective
norm are removed (de Vries, Dijkstra, & Kuhlman, 1988). Studies of young
White, Puerto Rican, and African American women also show strong effects
of efficacy on intention to smoke in the next month (Hanson, 1997).
The intention to obtain a genetic test of smoking addiction susceptibility
was also included as an indicator of the perceived seriousness of the impact of
the information primed by the abbreviated news account. Although we did
not expect the limited information in the news stories to have strong effects
on the intention to obtain a genetic test, differences between the primed and
unprimed conditions could result for those with a strong family history of
smoking.
The figure also hypothesizes that smoking history and genetic risk information might have direct effects on efficacy to quit smoking and the intention

to obtain a genetic test. In addition to these potential direct effects is the
mediated effect through inference of susceptibility to smoking addiction. To
test these direct and indirect effects, the statistical tests employed first a test
for direct effects and then added the indirect effects through the inference of
genetic susceptibility. In this way, we will be able to determine if the total
effect from genetic information and smoking history to efficacy and to intention to obtain a genetic test is both direct and indirect (that is, mediated) or
only one or the other.
To begin to fill the gap in research on the impact of news stories about
genetics, we conducted a survey of 450 young adult smokers3 in which they
were exposed to information about one of two news stories: a scientific study
linking genes to tobacco addiction (genetic story condition) or a scientific
study about the effects of smoking on sex of offspring (nongenetic story condition). We hypothesized that respondents exposed to genetic story condition
would be more likely than other respondents to infer that they had inherited
genes for liability to tobacco addiction and would have stronger intentions to
obtain a hypothetical genetic test for tobacco dependence as well as
decreased self-efficacy to quit. We also predicted that the effects of the news
story condition (genetic vs. nongenetic) on these outcomes would be moderated by smoking history and story believability. Specifically, we expected the
greatest impact of news story condition to be among participants who found
the story to be believed and those who have a stronger personal and family
history of smoking. Finally, we hypothesized that the effects on efficacy to
quit smoking and on intention to obtain a genetic test would be mediated by
the inference of genetic susceptibility to smoking addiction.

Method
Participants
A nationally representative sample of young adult smokers was obtained via
a random digit dialing survey conducted in May and June 2002 by Schulman,
Ronca, and Bucuvalas, Inc., on behalf of the University of Pennsylvania. The
sample included 450 young adults aged 18 to 25 who had smoked at least one
whole cigarette in the past 6 months.4 The sample was 52.2% male, 9.3% African American, 76% White, 21% married or living as married, and 35%
Protestant, 26% Catholic. The average education was about 13 years of
schooling (i.e., some college); the average age was 21.4 years (SD = 2.31). The
overall cooperation rate for the survey was 77%.5

Procedures
Subjects were randomly assigned to a genetic story or nongenetic story condition. The assignment to condition was done so that each condition contains a
random half of young adults who reported having at least one first-degree relative (mother, father, sister, or brother) who smoked on a daily basis for at
least 1 month and a random half of those who did not have any relatives with
a smoking history. Prior to the manipulation, we obtained measures of personal and family history of smoking. Following the manipulation, we
assessed believability of the claims in the genetic story, inferred genetic risk,
self-efficacy to quit smoking, and likelihood of getting a genetic test for
tobacco addiction.
To induce respondents to think about the possibility that they have inherited genes for smoking addiction and to tie that genetic predisposition to a
history of smoking in their family, respondents in the genetic story condition
heard the following:
The news media have recently reported on studies done by the National
Cancer Institute suggesting that some people are more at risk to
become addicted smokers than others because they have inherited certain genes. People who have a family history of smoking are more likely
to have inherited these genes, the stories have said.
To ensure reception of the information, respondents were asked the question “Have you read any of the stories in the newspaper about inheriting
genes related to smoking addiction?” To emphasize the link between genetics,
family history, and addiction to smoking, the question was repeated three
additional times about different media outlets: television, the Internet, and
radio.
Respondents assigned to the nongenetic story condition (i.e., the control
condition) received the following scenario.
The news media have recently reported on studies done at the National
Cancer Institute suggesting that smokers have more girl than boy
babies. Couples are more likely to have girl babies if either partner
smokes heavily while trying to conceive, the stories say.
Questions parallel to those for the genetic story followed the smoking
story. For example, one question read, “Have you read any of the stories in the
newspaper about smoking and having girl babies?” Both stories did in fact
appear in print within the previous year.

Measures
Outcome variables. Inferred genetic addiction was assessed by the following
item: “Based on everything you know and have heard about smoking and
addiction, how likely is it, do you think, that you have inherited genes that
will increase the chances of your becoming addicted to smoking cigarettes?”
Answers were coded on a 5-point scale, with 1 as impossible, 2 as possible but
very unlikely, and 5 as very likely (M = 2.78, SD = 1.49).
Intention to get a genetic test was measured by the following item.
Developments in genetic testing have come very quickly. Some tests try
to find out if people have inherited genes that increase their chances of
becoming addicted to smoking. How likely is it that you would get this
test if the test was totally confidential, accurate, painless, covered by
health insurance, and convenient to schedule?
As in previous research (Struewing, Lerman, Kase, Giambarresi, &
Tucker, 1995), this item was coded on a 4-point scale, from 1 as definitely not
to 4 as definitely get the test (M = 2.73, SD = 0.99).
Self-efficacy to quit smoking was obtained via a situational measure
employed by Velicer, DiClemente, Rossi, and Prochaska (1990). The format
for the questions was “How sure are you that you can quit smoking cigarettes
completely and permanently in the next 3 months if you really wanted to?”
Not at all sure = 1 and completely sure = 4. The other items asked about contexts where the person could avoid smoking after quitting when talking and
relaxing, at a party with friends, etc. The mean on this eight-item scale was
2.65 (SD = .82). The measure has excellent internal reliability (alpha = 0.91)
and good distributional properties.
Predictors and covariates. The credibility of the claims in the genetic story
was assessed on a 4-point believability scale, with 1 as not at all believable
and 4 as completely believable (M = 2.26, SD = 0.86 ).6 Research on persuasive
messages shows that effective ones should be believable, novel, and important (Morley & Walker, 1987). The judgment of the genetic story’s believability occurred later in the questionnaire, after questions about efficacy, smoking knowledge, and the two outcome measures. The believability of the claims
of both stories was assessed for all participants. However, when a story’s
claim believability is discussed below, we are referring only to believability of
the story about a genetic basis for smoking addiction.
Family history of smoking was computed as the ratio between the total
number of first-degree relatives (mother, father, sister, brother) who smoked

on a daily basis for 1 month or more, as reported by respondents, and the
respondent’s family size. The maximum number of first-degree relatives that
could be reported was four. This measure taps smoking among first-degree
relatives as a ratio to the number of such relatives. The measure varies
between 0 and 1 (M = 0.51, SD = 0.33). In analyses reported below, this scale
was split into three approximately equal categories to simplify analyses and
interpretations.

Analytic Procedure
The general linear model (GLM) was used to test hypotheses. This approach
was employed because inspection of the means on certain outcomes measures
indicated the possibility of curvilinear effects (linear plus quadratic) differing by experimental condition and blocking variables. Testing these nonlinear interactions via regression is possible (and was done for purposes of verification) but produces complex models with substantial multicollinearity
that is difficult to present and interpret (Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller, &
Nizam, 1998). The results from GLM will be F tests for a given predictor (or
interaction among predictors) along with graphical displays where the effect
is complex. The model of Figure 1 is tested in two steps: The first assesses
direct effects of the message and its interaction with family history on the
outcomes of efficacy to quit and intention to get a genetic test, and the second
step adds inference of genetic susceptibility to smoking addiction as a mediator. If the cognitive inference is a mediating variable, then any effects of the
message on intention or on efficacy should be reduced once the inference of
genetic susceptibility to smoking enters the prediction equation.

Results
Inferred Genetic Addiction
Results from the GLM predicting the inference of genetic susceptibility from
priming, family history of smoking, and believability of the story are presented in Table 1. Contrary to our hypothesis, the interaction effect between
priming a genetic susceptibility to smoking addiction and the person’s own
family history on inference of genetic susceptibility was not significant. In
fact, the direction of the priming effect is opposite to what was expected with
the control group’s mean (M = 2.89) greater than that of the priming group
(M = 2.65; t [df = 434] = 1.73, p = .085).
However, there are four significant effects in which the believability of the
story’s claim plays a significant role. There is a main effect for family history

Table 1
General Linear Model F Tests for Perceived Likelihood of Having Inherited Addiction
Genes
Variable

F

Intercept
879.50
Genetic prime
0.14
Family history
4.09
Claim credibility
42.50
Prime ´ Family History
0.05
Prime ´ Claim Credibility
2.74
Family History ´ Claim Credibility 2.81
Prime ´ Family History ´
Claim Credibility
0.55
Total (n = 432)
R2

7.16
.23

df1

df2

p

1
1
2
2
2
2
4

414
414
414
414
414
414
414

.000
.710
.020
.000
.950
.070
.020

4

414

.700

17

414

.000

(p < .02) and for claim credibility (p < .001), two interaction effects for family
history by claim credibility (p < .02), and a borderline effect for priming by
claim credibility (p < .07). The stronger the family history of smoking, the
more likely the inference of inheriting genes for smoking addiction (adjusted
means increase from 2.38, to 2.73, to 3.03).7 The strong effect of claim believability indicates that as the story’s claim is judged believable, the inference of
genetic susceptibility to smoking addiction is also seen as more likely.
Both of these main effects are embedded in two-way interactions plotted
in Figures 2 and 3.
The main effect for claim believability on the inference of genetic susceptibility is slightly stronger for those getting the genetic story prime than for
those getting the control story. For those judging the genetic story to be of low
to moderate believability, the slopes are the same. At high believability, those
hearing the gender story make a less strong inference of genetic susceptibility to smoking addiction than those getting the genetic prime story. The
genetic story may have primed the inference of susceptibility to smoking
addiction only for those judging the claim to be of the highest believability.
Family history also moderates the relationship between claim believability and inference. Those with the strongest family history of smoking also
have the strongest association between claim credibility and inference. Figure 3 shows a clear fan effect, such that at lowest believability, family history
does not predict inference of addiction susceptibility. At the highest believability, family history is linearly associated with the inference of smoking
addiction.

Inference of Genetic Susceptibility to Smoking
Addiction: Prime by Claim Credibility
4.5
4
3.5
Inference

3
2.5

Non-genetic
Genetic

2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Low Credible

Figure 2.

Mod Credible

Hi Credible

Impact of Genetic Information Prime and Story Credibility on Inference of
Genetic Susceptibility to Smoking Addiction

Inference

Inference of Genetic Susceptibility to Smoking
Addiction: Claim Credibility by Family History
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

Low Fam Hist
Mod Fam Hist
Strong Fam Hist

Low
Credible
Figure 3.

Mod
Credible

High
Credible

The Two-Way Interaction of Claim Credibility and Family History on the
Inference of Genetic Susceptibility to Smoking Addiction

Table 2
General Linear Model F Tests for Likelihood of Getting a Genetic Test With and
Without Inference of Genetic Susceptibility
Model 1
Variable

F

Intercept
1670.30
Prime genetic
0.18
Family history
0.48
Claim credibility
7.89
Prime ´ Family History
0.59
Prime ´ Claim Credibility 3.55
Family History ´ Claim
0.53
Credibility
Prime ´ Family History ´
1.23
Claim Credibility
Infer genetic addiction
Total (n = 431)
2
R

df1

df2

Model 2
p

F

df1

df2

p

1
1
2
2
2
2
4

424
424
424
424
424
424
424

.000
.670
.620
.000
.550
.030
.720

376.600
0.007
0.180
1.230
0.270
2.780
0.150

1
1
2
2
2
2
4

412
412
412
412
412
412
412

.000
.930
.840
.290
.760
.060
.960

4

424

.300

0.910

4

412

.460

25.800

1

412

.000

3.160 18
0.12

412

.000

1.82 17
0.07

424

.030

Likelihood of Getting a Genetic Test
A similar set of analyses was conducted for the likelihood of getting a genetic
test. Two GLMs were run, first with all main and interaction effects for
genetic prime, family history, and claim credibility but without the inference
of genetic susceptibility to addiction as the mediator. The second GLM
included the inference as a mediator. The results are presented in Table 2.
In Model 1, the intention to obtain a genetic test for smoking addiction is
predicted by claim credibility and by the interaction of genetic prime with
claim credibility. As the claim is seen as more credible, the intention to obtain
a genetic test for smoking addiction increases from 2.35 to 2.80 to 3.08 (p <
.001). This main effect is actually steeper for those getting the genetic prime
than for those in the control condition, as is graphed in Figure 4 (p < .03). The
relationship between story believability and the intention to obtain a genetic
test is strengthened in the genetic prime case in comparison to the control.
However, these effects are mediated by inference of genetic susceptibility.
In the second model of Table 2, inference of genetic susceptibility is added. It
has a significant linear effect on intention to get a genetic test (B = .18, p <
.001). The two significant effects involving claim believability are rendered
nonsignificant, although the interaction between claim credibility and priming is borderline (p = .06).

Intention to Get Genetic Test: Prime by Claim Credibility

3.5

Genetic Test

3
2.5
Non-genetic
Genetic
2
1.5
1
Low Credibiltiy Mod Credibility Hi Credibility
Figure 4.

The Effect of Genetic Information Prime and Claim Credibility on the Likelihood of Getting a Genetic Test for Smoking Addiction

The analyses presented in Table 2 suggest that any effects of believable
stories about the role of genetics and family history of addiction on intention
to get a genetic test are mediated through an inference audiences make about
their personal likelihood of having inherited such genes. All other effects are
reduced to nonsignificance with only a borderline effect of prime by claim
credibility remaining.

Efficacy to Quit Smoking
Table 3 presents two models predicting efficacy to quit smoking. The first
uses all the main and interaction effects for genetic prime, family history, and
claim credibility without the inference of genetic addiction. The second
includes all the predictors from Model 1 plus the inference of genetic
addiction.
The only significant effect in Model 1 is family history. As family history of
smoking becomes stronger, the efficacy to quit smoking decreases from 2.85
to 2.81 to 2.51 (p < .03). Although the genetic prime story had no elements
relating directly to self-efficacy, it could have indirect effects on efficacy by
inviting a genetic inference of genetic susceptibility to smoking addiction
that in turn could undermine efficacy. Model 2 tests this possibility.

Table 3
General Linear Model F Tests for Efficacy to Quit Smoking With and Without Inference of Genetic Addiction
Model 1
Variable

F

Intercept
2,450.00
Prime genetic
1.14
Family history
3.67
Claim credibility
1.26
Prime ´ Family History
1.52
Prime ´ Claim Credibility 2.01
Family History ´ Claim
1.32
Credibility
Prime ´ Family History ´
0.64
Claim Credibility
Infer genetic addiction
Total (n = 432)
2
R

df1

df2

Model 2
p

F

df1

df2

p

1
1
2
2
2
2
4

425
425
425
425
425
425
425

.000 1,003.400
.290
1.070
.030
2.600
.29
3.210
.220
1.420
.140
1.170
.260
1.460

1
1
2
2
2
2
4

413
413
413
413
413
413
413

.000
.300
.080
.040
.240
.310
.220

4

425

.640

0.630

4

413

.640

19.660

1

413

.000

2.21 18
.088

413

.003

1.19 17
.05

425

.260

Model 2 increases the variance explained from 5% to 8.8%. Family history
is no longer significant but remains borderline (p = .08). The inference of
genetic addiction is a significant, negative predictor of self-efficacy (B = –.13,
p < .001). Whatever effects of story there are on efficacy are mediated through
the cognitive inference persons make about their own susceptibility to
genetic addiction for smoking.

Discussion
Our data focus on the perception of a particular aspect of perceived risk—the
possibility of inheriting genes for smoking addiction—and actions that could
be taken to move from perception to reality (i.e., getting a genetic test) as well
as perceptions important to both the intention and actuality of quitting (i.e.,
self-efficacy). There are three broad results from the study: (a) The priming
manipulation did not function as expected, (b) believability of the claim was
an important factor mediating and moderating the impact of the genetic
news prime on cognitive inferences about genetic susceptibility to addiction,
and (c) the cognitive inference of susceptibility mediated the effects of the
news prime on efficacy to quit smoking and on intention to get a genetic test.

Priming
One of the primary mechanisms for influence through the news media is
priming of specific thoughts and their mental neighbors, making them more
salient and accessible (Price & Tewksbury, 1997; Valentino, Hutchings, &
White, 2002). Our attempt to prime some of our respondents to associate family history of smoking with a susceptibility to genetic addiction for smoking
did not work. In fact, those primed were marginally less likely to infer they
were likely to have a genetic addiction to smoking than those not primed.
This marginal effect is significant when family history of smoking and parental health are controlled (B = –.28, p < .05).
One possibility is that those in the prime condition (all of whom are
smokers) engaged in a kind of defensive processing of the primed message—
perhaps because they felt vulnerable and perceived themselves to be less in
control of their behavior in light of this claim (Liberman & Chaiken, 1992;
Sagarin, Cialdini, Rice, & Serna, 2002). Defensive processing is one kind of
resistance to messages that challenge existing behavior patterns. There are
many others (Knowles & Linn, 2004; Wegnerer, Petty, Smoak, & Fabrigar,
2004), including selective avoidance, defensive inattention, counterarguing,
reactance, attitude strength, and others.
Those in the prime condition, on hearing about the possible genetic link to
smoking addiction, might resist this claim, processing it defensively. They
might counterargue, leading to a perception that they are less under the control of genetic factors than typical others and, therefore, more efficacious to
control their smoking behavior if they so choose. Although we do not have any
direct evidence that those in the prime condition experience greater anxiety,
withdrawal, vulnerability, reactance or inattention, some other data from our
study are supportive.
In the survey, immediately after the experimental manipulations were
delivered and all pertinent outcome questions were asked, another set of questions queried respondents about their perceptions about lung cancer deaths.
The question asked for an estimate of the number of people out of 100 lifetime
smokers who will die of lung cancer.8 The overall correlation between a smoking behavior index (based on smoking history and perceived addiction)9 and
estimates of lung cancer deaths is –.13 (p < .01). When people are primed to
think about a genetic basis for smoking addiction, this overall negative relationship is even more negative. Regression results indicate a significant
interaction effect between priming and the smoking index (p < .03), such that
those being primed actually have lower estimates of the number of lung cancer
deaths when they have a stronger history of smoking than those not primed.
Neither main effect is significant. These results are graphed in Figure 5.
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Estimated Marginal Means for the Number of Lung Cancer Deaths Predicted
by the Interaction of Personal Smoking History and Priming of Genetic Susceptibility to Smoking Addiction

Heavier smokers have a more optimistic view of the susceptibility of smokers to death from lung cancer, judging fewer deaths to result, the stronger
their own smoking habits. In our data, priming genetic susceptibility not only
fails to foster the inference of one’s own susceptibility to a genetic addiction to
smoking (perhaps through some form of defensive processing such as
counterarguing) but shows a tendency to the opposite inference and, consistent with this observation, greater optimism about lung cancer deaths from
smoking than if the priming had not occurred.
The reason for these effects cannot be found in differences in judged
believability of the claim made in the priming versus control conditions.
Recall that all respondents evaluated the believability of the claim that
“some people are more at risk to become habitual smokers than others
because they have inherited certain genes from their family.” No differences
in credibility of the claim were obtained between prime and control conditions (t[441] = 1.4, p > .15), even though in the prime condition, the priming of
the association between family history and genetic addiction occurred four
times, and the credibility of the National Cancer Institute and the news
media supported the claim.
In hindsight, the results of the priming manipulation perhaps should have
been anticipated. Previous research on risk perception suggests that

optimism biases are common in many behaviors (Klein & Helweg-Larson,
2002). For example, young adult smokers in one study believed that they had
better than average health in comparison to other smokers (and, in some
cases, to nonsmokers) and that quitting would have little immediate benefit
for their health (Prokhorov et al., 2003). Weinstein (1998) offered data showing that the inaccuracies in smoker’s perceptions about health implications
tended to minimize perceived risk. The paradoxical conclusion is that these
optimistic biases, in turn, are associated with an elevated sense of control of
future events (Klein & Helweg-Larson, 2002), possibly enhancing efficacy
and the confidence to act to reduce risk.
Our results on priming are consistent with these biases. In future studies,
where the credibility of the story might be more fully elaborated, information
about genetic susceptibilities might be more difficult to reject cognitively
with the result that optimism biases may be less likely to operate. The operation of the optimism bias in this case may seem beneficial in that efficacy
could be enhanced, a known necessary condition for the intention to quit
smoking. However, our discussion of the effects of priming so far has ignored
individual differences in how credible people thought the genetic story to be.
Interpreting the message: Claim believability. Defensive avoidance and
optimism biases center on the general, unmediated effect of the priming
manipulation on basic cognitive reactions—namely, the inference of one’s
own genetic susceptibility to smoking addiction. However, message factors
are likely to work through various kinds of interpretive processes, an
assumption that Albarracin (2002) has made central to her persuasion paradigm extending the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
Interpretive approaches have been central to understanding how people
respond to health risk through processes of threat representation, strategies
for coping with the threat, and appraisal of the effectiveness of coping
(Leventhal & Diefenbach, 1991; Leventhal et al., 1997).
Albarracin’s (2002) model is less concerned with interpretation of threat
and risk associated with health and more focused on the general mechanisms
through which the interpretation of messages might account for their effects.
In our data, claim believability and family history of smoking act as mediators of the effects of the priming manipulation producing consequences for
efficacy and intention to get a genetic test that are different from the unmediated main effects of priming alone.
The following conclusions about claim believability found support: (a)
When a news story’s claim is considered believable, smokers with a family
smoking history will be more likely to infer that they could have inherited
genes for addiction; (b) priming the association between family history and

genetic addiction to smoking in news stories does not increase the likelihood
of the inference of personal genetic susceptibility, unless the story’s claim is
judged to be believable; (c) when priming, family history and claim believability are considered simultaneously as predictors of the inference of genetic
susceptibility (Table 1)—the (unexpected) direct effect of priming alone
becomes nonsignificant with its effects absorbed by the two-way interactions
of claim credibility with priming and with family history.
In Albarracin’s (2002) framework, family history and judged credibility of
the claim represent aspects of interpretive filters mediating the effects of the
message in the prime condition. How the claim is interpreted (that is,
believed) makes a substantial difference in whether people attribute to themselves the inference that they could have a genetic basis for their smoking
behavior. Those who interpret the claim as believable and who either are
primed by the news account or have a family history of smoking are more
likely to infer their genetic susceptibility. In turn, this inference is linked
strongly to efficacy to quit smoking but in a negative direction. That is, those
who infer a genetic susceptibility also attribute to themselves a lower efficacy
to quit smoking that, based on past evidence, would be linked to a lower intention to try to quit smoking (de Vries et al., 1988; Velicer et al., 1990).
Claim believability plays a significant role in accounting for variance in a
person’s inference of genetic susceptibility to addiction. Because credibility
was not manipulated in this study, we cannot know if increasing the usual
cues of credible information (e.g., source bias, status, expertise and trustworthiness, evidence for the claim, etc.) will increase the impact of public information on inference-making about genetic susceptibility. However, some
indirect evidence about claim believability suggests that it is not simply an
individual difference factor reflecting characteristics such as skepticism bred
of education. For example, the correlation between claim credibility and
years of education was .015 (p = .76), indicating that education was unrelated
to judged claim credibility.
Story (and claim) credibility are likely to remain extremely important in
future research on effects of news media stories because public opinion data
suggest considerable variability in how much influence genes are perceived
to have in accounting for differences in personality, disease, behavior, and
physical characteristics (Singer, Cornea, & Lamias, 1998). For example, in a
1997 poll cited by Singer et al. (1998), alcoholism was seen to be the result of
genetic or hereditary factors mostly or completely (33%), somewhat (44%),
and not at all (20%). Focus group members concluded that lung cancers were
because of genetic factors about 31% and personal factors about 32%, with
environmental and social factors accounting for the remainder (Parrott, Silk,
& Condit, 2003). Given variation in the importance of genetic factors in public

perceptions of influence, establishing the credibility of claims about genetic
influence will be crucial in future research as will obtaining information
about the perceived magnitude of genetic influences, even given their believability. Some aspects of story credibility likely to be important include argument strength (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the use of vivid examples
(Zillman & Brosius, 2000), certainty about the claims’ validity, and other factors (Devos-Comby & Salovey, 2002). Future research will need to examine
some of the attributes that make health stories, particularly those about
genetics, credible beyond simply the source’s status.
Mediating role of inference of genetic susceptibility. As described in Figure
1, a person’s inference of a genetic susceptibility to smoking addiction mediates the effects of message priming on efficacy and on the intention to get a
test. Specifically, (a) the effects of a believable news story on intention to get a
genetic test for smoking addiction depends on making the inference that one
could have inherited genes for addiction, and (b) self-efficacy to quit smoking
depends on the inference of genetic susceptibility to smoking addiction.
Respondents’ inferences that they might have inherited genes for addiction played a significant role in their intentions to obtain a genetic test. It was
the strongest predictor in the model for intention to get a test (B = .18, p <
.001; Table 2). This suggests that understanding the basis for the inference
that one has inherited genes for addiction is important in understanding the
desire to obtain a genetic test for smoking. People can overestimate or underestimate their likelihood of having a genetic addiction for smoking or be completely in error about their susceptibility. Yet given the association between
the cognitive inference and intention to get a test, understanding the impact
of message characteristics on the inference has increased importance. Previous research in cancer genetics and testing has shown that despite strong
intentions to obtain a genetic test among high-risk individuals (Streuwing
et al., 1995), rates of actual uptake of genetic testing were much lower than
anticipated (Lerman, Schulman, Narod, & Lynch, 1996; Lerman et al., 1999).
However, in the context of a genetic test for a modifiable behavior, such as
smoking, other factors such as self-efficacy may play a key role in actual test
use (Codori et al., 1999).
Those inferring they were susceptible to a genetic addiction to smoking
felt less efficacious to quit over and above their family history of smoking and
their belief in the credibility of claim of a genetic basis for smoking addiction.
However, self-efficacy in quitting was not affected by the genetic story prime.
Because self-efficacy is an important factor in the intention to quit (a necessary condition to actual quit attempts; de Vries et al. 1988; Velicer et al.,

1990), a better understanding of the effects of credible news stories and priming effects on self-efficacy is warranted.
Conclusion. A few other limitations of the present study should be noted.
Although the cooperation rate for the survey was good (77%), it is possible
that respondents and nonrespondents differ on smoking history or other
important characteristics that could bias study outcomes. In addition, the
sample was composed of young adults, and the results may not generalize to
older populations who are often more ready to give serious consideration to
giving up smoking (Woods et al., 2002). Finally, this study used brief oral
descriptions of news stories rather than the actual news stories; assessing
the impact of the latter is an important topic for future research. Despite
these potential limitations, our results indicate that family smoking history
and information from credible news stories have important effects on beliefs
about risk of inheriting genes for smoking susceptibility and on intentions to
obtain a genetic test. These results are just the first steps in understanding
the naïve inferences people make and how these inferences play into judgments about efficacy to quit and intention to obtain a genetic test.

Notes
1. Corresponding and reprint address: Joseph N. Cappella, 3620 Walnut St.,
Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
19104-6220; jcappella@asc.upenn.edu; 215-898-7059. This research was supported by
the Annenberg Public Policy Center and grants from the National Cancer Institute P50
CA095856 (Joseph N. Cappella, Caryn Lerman) and National Institute on Drug Abuse
P50 CA84718 (Caryn Lerman).
2. Content analyses have not given as much attention to broadcast media as to print
media. However, researchers have considered the description and impact of how
genetic influences are framed.
3. The sample focused on young, adult smokers because some research suggests
that this is an important transitional period from the testing time of adolescence to the
habits of adulthood. For some, the period is marked by progression to habitual smoking
and increases in smoking rates (Baranowski et al., 1997; Lantz, 2002).
4. This criterion does produce a high percentage of current smokers: 83% have
smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their lifetime; 53% smoked everyday in the past 30
days, and only 8% did not smoke at all in the same period; 68% labeled themselves as
smokers. With the national rate of smokers at about 22% using a more stringent criterion than “one whole cigarette in the past 6 months” would have made a random digit
dialing sample of this size prohibitively expensive.
5. This rate is Cooperation Rate 1 as defined by the American Association for Public
Opinion Research (2004).
6. In testing, this four-level scale was reduced to three by collapsing the two middle
categories (slightly and very). This aids interpretation of the analysis of variance

models. Testing with the four-level scale was also carried out using regression and linear and quadratic effects and interactions with similar results.
7. Main effects are interpreted in the context of significant interaction effects when
the interaction effects are not crossed but instead indicate variation in slopes all of the
same direction. In this situation, the main effects are not distortions of the underlying
effects for subgroups.
8. Actually, the question was asked in four different contexts, each prefacing the
same question about the number of lung cancer deaths with a statement alerting the
respondent that other questions about other diseases would follow. One of the four versions was significantly different from the other three, F(3, 428) = 3.00, p < .03. In results
reported in the text, question format is controlled.
9. Smoking behaviors were assessed by five items that measured whether respondents smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their life, whether they ever smoked a cigarette
every day for at least a month, whether in the past 30 days they smoked at least one cigarette daily, whether they consider themselves smokers and addicted to smoking. All
items were coded 1 for an affirmative answer and 0 for a negative one. The items were
averaged into an index (Cronbach’s alpha = .87).
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